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ABSTRACT
Windows OS is facing a huge rise in kernel attacks. An overview of popular techniques that result in
loading kernel drivers will be presented. One of the key targets of modern threats is disabling and blinding
Microsoft Defender, a default Windows AV. The analysis of recent driver-based attacks will be given, the
challenge is to block them. The survey of user- and kernel-level attacks on Microsoft Defender will be
given. One of the recently published attackers’ techniques abuses Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC) and
Security Reference Monitor (SRM) by modifying Integrity Level and Debug Privileges for the Microsoft
Defender via syscalls. However, this user-mode attack can be blocked via the Windows “trust labels”
mechanism. The presented paper discovered the internals of MIC and SRM, including the analysis of
Microsoft Defender during malware detection. We show how attackers can attack Microsoft Defender using
a kernel-mode driver. This driver modifies the fields of the Token structure allocated for the Microsoft
Defender application. The presented attack resulted in disabling Microsoft Defender, without terminating
any of its processes and without triggering any Windows security features, such as PatchGuard. The
customized hypervisor-based solution named MemoryRanger was used to protect the Windows Defender
kernel structures. The experiments show that MemoryRanger successfully restricts access to the sensitive
kernel data from illegal access attempts with affordable performance degradation.
Keywords: hypervisor-based protection, Mandatory Integrity Control, Security Reference Monitor,
Windows kernel, Intel, attacks on Defender, kernel data protection.
Enforcement (DSE), which is designed to restrict
attackers from loading malware drivers.

1. INTRODUCTION
Microsoft Windows is the dominating desktop
operating system (OS) worldwide, and it is still
facing a huge number of kernel-mode threats. The
key challenge is that all loaded kernel drivers share
the same memory space with the rest of the
Windows OS kernel. There is no built-in solution to
control and restrict all memory access between
these drivers and sensitive kernel data. As a result,
kernel driver-based attacks are still dangerous for
Windows OS. The global trend of kernel threats is
to bypass AV/EDR solutions by disabling or
blinding them to achieve a permanent and
undetectable malware presence on a computer.

DSE requires a special Kernel Mode Code Signing
(KMCS) that allows loading kernel drivers with
special digital code signatures only, and it is no
longer possible to load unsigned drivers. Attackers
can disable DSE by modifying kernel variable
nt!g_CiEnabled (CI!g_CiOptions). Since Windows
8.1, this variable is protected by PatchGuard
(Poslušný, 2022) and in Windows 11 this variable
is protected by MmProtectDriverSection through
static KDP (Hollow, 2021). Attackers can leverage
the following techniques to gain kernel privileges:
•
•

Windows experts are well familiar with this
challenge and continue developing various
outstanding security solutions to restrict the scope
of kernel-mode attacks. One of the integrated
security mechanisms is called Driver Signature

•

Load and exploit signed vulnerable drivers;
Sign malware drivers by stolen digital
certificates.
Pass WHQL tests as legal drivers;

Malware Abuse Signed Buggy Drivers.
According to Foster (2021) from CrowdStrike, “in
a typical kernel attack, adversaries install and load
1
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a known vulnerable driver to gain access to the
system”. Two security points can be underlined.
The first is that malicious actors can “leverage this
vulnerable driver to access the kernel, where they
can perform any number of actions, including
deleting or deactivating security measures”. The
second point is that “since these drivers are
legitimately signed and certificate revocation is
difficult, unpatched versions of the drivers can be
used “in the wild” for years without being detected
or blocked”.

signed driver of EaseUS Partition Master
(Guerrero-Saade, 2022).
One more example of the BYOVD technique is
KDMapper, a recently issued tool by Cruz (2021)
that exploits the Intel driver (iqvw64e.sys) to
manually map non-signed drivers in memory.
Hfiref0x issued several security tools: Turla Driver
Loader named TDL (Hfiref0x, 2019) is designed to
bypass
Windows
x64
Driver
Signature
Enforcement (DSE) and Kernel Driver Utility
named KDU (Hfiref0x, 2022a) that uses vulnerable
drivers as “providers” to disable DSE, map any
driver, and execute it.

Atsiv utility by Linchpin Labs is one of the first
toolkits that allow loading of unsigned drivers in
Windows Vista x64. Atsiv used its own PE loader
that was not visible in Windows standard drivers
list. On the one hand, it is a rootkit-type behavior
and, on the other hand, the Atsiv driver is not
malicious by itself. Microsoft blocked this tool by
revoking its certificate (Espiner, 2007).

Pham et al. (2022) concerned that “many
collections of vulnerable drivers are easily found on
the Internet”. Eclypsium researchers, Jesse and
Shkatov (2019) found more than 40 vulnerable
drivers, all them “come from trusted third-party
vendors, signed by valid Certificate Authorities,
and certified by Microsoft”.

According to the MITRE (2021), the attack
technique that abuses digitally signed vulnerable
kernel drivers is called Bring Your Own Vulnerable
Driver (BYOVD). Adversaries may include the
vulnerable driver with files delivered to the target
machine.

The security problems of vulnerable drivers can
greatly impact the target system. SentinelLabs
experts discovered five high severity bugs in the
Dell driver from its BIOS update utility. Hackers
can exploit these bugs to gain kernel-mode
privileges to attack hundreds of millions of
computers worldwide, including desktops, laptops,
and tablets. The list of affected computers has over
380 models. One more key challenge is that these
high severity vulnerabilities have remained
undisclosed for more than 10 years (Dekel, 2021;
Clark, 2021).

Baines (2021) from Rapid7 highlighted that
BYOVD is a common technique used by advanced
adversaries and opportunistic attackers alike. The
author provided about 30 malware examples that
use various legitimate drivers to prove that
BYOVD is a valuable technique.
According to Poslušný (2022), ESET experts
analyzed recent malware cases that utilized
vulnerable drivers and note that this problem is not
new, having been widely discussed in the past.
Nevertheless, it is still a security issue as of this
date. Here are some high-profile APT that used the
BYOVD technique:
•
•
•
•
•

Malware Drivers Signed by Stolen Certificates.
Usage of stolen, leaked or misused third-party
certificates is a common attacker’s technique. For
example, DirtyMoe malware uses a driver signed
with a revoked certificate. Chlumecký (2021)
discovered that Windows allows loading drivers
signed with revoked certificates even if an
appropriate certificate revocation list (CRL) is
locally stored.

Slingshot APT leverages the following
buggy drivers Goad, SpeedFan, Sandra,
and ElbyCDIO;
InvisiMole APT leverages SpeedFan.sys;
RobbinHood ransomware uses a Gigabyte
motherboard driver.
Moriya rootkit loads VirtualBox driver
(Lechtik and Dedola, 2021).
A
data
wiper
malware
named
HermeticWiper abuses epmntdrv.sys, a

According to the research by Barysevich (2018),
Kozák et al. (2018), and Shoeb (2021) the Dark
Web is one of the main platforms for selling codesigning certificates, including Extended Validation
(EV) certificates to sign critical code such as
Windows drivers.
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Abrams (2022) has found that recently leaked
Nvidia code code-signing certificates have already
been used by attackers to sign malware drivers.

dozen UEFI vulnerabilities that impact millions of
devices (Kovacs, 2022).
WHQL Scandal. Since 2016, Microsoft has
required all third-party drivers submitted via its
Windows Hardware Quality Labs (WHQL) testing
process to be digitally signed by Microsoft itself.
WHQL opens the door to get the driver distributed
through Windows Update or the Microsoft Update
Catalog. Microsoft Hardware Certification is a
rigorous process of drivers validation. However,
according to Fingas (2021) and Vijayan (2021),
Microsoft has accidentally signed several malware
drivers in recent months.

Fortinet Sde-Or and Voronovitch (2022),
researchers with Fortinet's FortiGuard Labs,
analyzed novel kernel rootkit named ‘Fire Chili’,
that is signed using stolen digital certificates from
Frostburn Studios (game developer) or from
Comodo (security software). The rootkit is
designed to hide and protect malicious artifacts:
files, processes, registry keys and network
connections from user-space security solutions.
Kwon et al. (2021) investigated the characteristics
of code-signing abuse and observed that this issue
is quite prevalent in South Korea. They underlined
that only 6.8% of the abused certificates are
revoked, which leads to extending the validity of
certified malware in the wild.

Netfilter driver was the first rootkit discovered to
be using WHQL digital signature issued by
Microsoft directly. Despite connecting to malware
C&C servers, this driver successfully passed
through the Windows Hardware Compatibility
Program (WHCP). MSRC (2021) has confirmed
that the malicious driver has been accidentally
signed.

Kernel-level Anti-Cheat Software. One more
kernel threat is coming from the game protection
industry. Game developers issue a special system of
software against cheats to keep the game fair and
square. Modern anti-cheat engines include kernelmode drivers, such as Ricochet Anti-Cheat protects
Call of Duty and Easy Anti-Cheat protects more
than 80 games and is installed by over 100 million
PC players globally. Latić (2021) and Menegus
(2022) are raising concern that bugs in such drivers
can have a high impact on many users. For
example, Genshin Impact, an action game, installs
an anti-cheat driver named mhyprot2 to protect the
game process. However, this driver can be used to
get illegal read and write access to the kernel
memory Oki (2021a).

FiveSys is one more malware driver with a
Microsoft’s valid WHQL digital signature.
Bitdefender’s experts reported that this malware is
similar to the Netfilter and targeted online video
games in China region for over a year (Istrate et al.,
2021).
Microsoft Vulnerable and Malicious Driver
Reporting Center. Microsoft (2021) launches a
new Vulnerable and Malicious Driver Reporting
Center to fight the high rise of attacks based on
vulnerable signed drivers. Using Windows
Defender Security Intelligence (WDSI), formerly
known as Microsoft Malware Protection Center
(MMPC) users can submit a driver that will be
analyzed by the Microsoft automated scanner.

Lechtik et al. (2021), security experts from
Kaspersky Lab, revealed that the Cheat Engine
driver (dbk64.sys) was used by Demodex rootkit
from GhostEmperor’s infection chain to bypass the
Windows
Driver
Signature
Enforcement
mechanism.

Using signed buggy drivers attackers can
accomplish a wide variety of tasks, for example,
they can access virtual kernel memory for reading
and writing. Various worldwide researches such as
Rui (2020), Malvica (2020), Stein (2020), Bs
(2020), and VL (2020) showed that attackers can
tamper with kernel callback routines to prevent
notifying the AV/EDR solutions of things such as
process creation, thread creation, image loading,
which is crucial for endpoint security.

UEFI Security Threats. Another big trend is UEFI
firmware-level malware implants, which are
usually highly targeted. MoonBounce revealed by
Lechtik et al. (2022) from Kaspersky Lab is one of
the recent stealthy UEFI rootkits that can inject a
malicious driver into the Windows kernel. Security
researchers from Binarly have found more than two

The security experts from Positive Technologies
(2021) analyzed the recent trends of kernel-mode
3
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threats and highlighted that 77% of rootkits are
used for espionage purposes. They concluded that
the main task of modern kernel-mode rootkits is to
prevent the detection of further malicious activity.

without triggering any security features, see
Figure 1. We assume that attackers are not able to
disable PatchGuard.
Microsoft Windows Improving Defenses Against
Growing Kernel Threats. Microsoft continues
expanding its kernel-mode protection by issuing
Kernel Patch Protection (KPP), informally known
as PatchGuard, and Secure Kernel Patch Guard
(SKPG) also known as HyperGuard (HG) to restrict
access attempts from kernel drivers to the sensitive
kernel memory (Shafir, 2022). However, there are
several open-source research projects designed to
disable the PatchGuard:

Pham et al. (2022) raised the security problem with
vulnerable kernel-mode drivers. They mentioned
research projects developed by _xeroxz to map
unsigned code into the kernel memory using
physical memory read and write permissions as
well as highlighting the problem of using
vulnerable
drivers
to
bypass
anti-cheat
mechanisms. They underline the fact that attackers
can abuse vulnerable drivers to bypass or blind
security products without terminating them, which
prevents revealing the fact of the attack.

•
•
•
•

Currently, we can conclude that the global kernel
malware trend is to disable or blind security
solutions. As the default Windows AV, Microsoft
Defender is facing a huge rise in attacks.

NoPatchGuardCallback by Oki (2021b);
UPGDSED by hfiref0x (2019);
EfiGuard by Lavrijsen (2021);
Shark by Blindtiger (2021).

Windows 10 introduced a new security concept
named Virtualization-based security, or VBS,
which leverages Hyper-V, a Windows hypervisor,
and hardware virtualization features to protect data
using containers.

Threat model. Let us assume that using various
approaches, intruders can execute malicious kernel
code to disable, blind, or terminate Microsoft
Defender by reading and overwriting kernel data

i) Open files
on the disk
(file is deleted)

Unpacks & install
a malware

Attackers App

ii) Open
launched
processes

Some Known
malware

(process is blocked)

Use a kernel driver to disable
Microsoft Defender by
patching its kernel structures

Microsoft
Defender
Application
User mode
Kernel mode

Vulnerable
Signed Drivers
(BYOVD)

Signed Drivers
that provide R/W
access to kernel

Signed Drivers
designed to load
unsigned drivers

Malware Drivers
signed with
leaked certificates

• Kernel-level AntiCheat Software

• Mimikatz

• Atsiv

• DirtyMoe malware

Microsoft
Defender
R/W access

• Internal and OS
data structures

UEFI/BIOS
implants

Figure 1 Attackers use the facilities of kernel-mode drivers to tamper with Microsoft Defender
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Windows includes several new VBS features, such
as Device Guard (DG) and Credential Guard (CG)
that enhance the safety of the OS and user data
using Hyper-V (Yosifovich et al., 2017).

However, these hypervisor-based protection
technologies include several limitations:
•

VBS creates the Virtual Secure Mode (VSM), also
known as Core Isolation, to segregate the most
sensitive Windows services and data from attackers
by using two Virtual Trust Levels (VTLs): VTL0
and VTL1.

•

VSM Secure Mode (VTL1) contains critical parts
of the OS: Secure Kernel (SK) and Isolated User
Mode (IUM) processes called trustlets. While VSM
Normal Mode (VTL0) contains the main part of the
OS kernel, all the rest of the drivers and
applications including attackers’ ones. VBS
guarantees the security boundary between VTL0
and VTL1. VBS/Secure Kernel is currently
renamed Windows Defender System Guard
Container (Bisson, 2019).

•

VBS is mainly designed to protect
Windows components. VBS does not
provide APIs to isolate the memory of
third-party drivers and apps;
VBS supports only two isolated enclaves,
without providing API functions to allocate
more enclaves and provide fine-grained
protection;
KDP does not provide any API for
developers to protect the memory of thirdparty drivers.

HVCI Driver Blacklist and Microsoft
Vulnerable Driver Blocklist. HypervisorProtected Code Integrity (HVCI) is a security
feature introduced in Windows 10. Enabled HVCI
provides blacklist-based validation for each attempt
to load a driver. Hfiref0x (2022b) analyzed this
feature and concluded that this list does not include
some known vulnerable drivers and should be
bigger twice or triple. Microsoft VP D. Weston
(2022) highlighted that Microsoft Defender for
Windows 11 and 10 gains new security feature
named Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to
address vulnerable drivers. This feature is based on
virtualization-based security (Carnevale, 2022).

Without enabled VBS, attackers can easily extract
users’ credentials from LSASS memory by
disabling SRM and PPL mechanisms (Korkin,
2021). CG helps to prevent such attacks on users’
credentials. CG allows storing credentials in
memory of the Isolated Local Security
Authentication Server (Lsaiso.exe), which is
located in VTL 1 Trustlet.

Microsoft Defender is Under Attack Itself. A
serious VBS drawback is the lack of protection of
critical processes, such as MsMpEng or the
Antimalware Service Executable, which is an
important part of Windows Security, formerly
known as Windows Defender. This leads to the
high rise of the various attacks on Microsoft
Defender to disable and blind it.

CG helps to prevent one more important attack
presented by Chilikov and Khorunzhenko (2015)
and results in retrieving the cryptographic keys by
accessing CNG!RandomSalt and CNG!g_ShaHash.
Thanks to the CG, the kernel drivers are not able to
access CNG variables, because these values are
protected by SK (ERNW, 2019).
Device Guard (DG) is designed to protect machines
from different kinds of software- and hardwarebased attacks. DG leverages code integrity and
enforces code integrity policies.

Microsoft Defender is the primary AV on more
than half a billion devices. Lefferts (2021),
Corporate Vice President, Microsoft 365 Security,
said that, according to Gartner, Microsoft is the
Leader in the Endpoint Protection Platforms (EPP)
Magic Quadrant.

Kernel Data Protection (KDP) is one more
mechanism designed to prevent attacks on kernel
data. According to the Windows Base Kernel
Team, KDP provides the ability to mark some
kernel memory as read-only, preventing attackers
from ever modifying protected memory (Allievi,
2020).

T. Ganacharya, Partner Director for Security
Research at Microsoft Defender for Endpoint,
underlined that “Windows Defender is protecting
more than 50% of the Windows ecosystem, so
we're a big target, and everyone wants to evade us
to get the maximum number of victims” (Tung,
2019).
5
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“Dynamic Code Security” mitigation of the
Microsoft Defender Application.

Various security experts analyzed the internals of
popular EDR/AV solutions, including Microsoft
Defender, to bypass them (Karantzas and Patsakis
2021, Botacin et al.,2022).

Narib (2020) presented a series of posts about the
internals of WdFilter.sys driver, which is the main
kernel component of Microsoft Defender and
provides File System Minifilter, and handlers
operations in callbacks, such as process and thread
creation; image loading, desktop handle and
registry operations. Narib (2019) also analyzed the
WdBoot.sys, a Microsoft Defender ELAM driver.

The presented paper shows a new attack on
Microsoft Defender based on abusing Windows
security mechanisms by kernel driver without
triggering PatchGuard.
The customized MemoryRanger will be used to
prevent such attacks by restricting illegal access to
the kernel data structure.

Vella (2019) at the CrikeyCon 2019 presented his
results about reversing EDR solutions and analyzed
their weaknesses.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 provides the analysis of existing attacks
on Microsoft Defender that can result in disabling,
terminating, and blinding Windows AV.

Various research results regarding bypassing and
evading Microsoft Defender were given by
IredTeam (2019), purpl3f0x (2021).

Section 3 presents the details of the proposed kernel
attack on Microsoft Defender. This section includes
an explanation of the involved Windows Internals
mechanisms.

Malicious Software vs Microsoft Defender.
Malware is continuing to attack Microsoft
Defender. The following malware examples will be
reviewed: TrickBot Trojan, Zloader Trojan,
DeroHE ransomware.

Section 4 contains the details of MemoryRanger
customization to prevent these attacks.

One of the recent versions of TrickBot Trojan uses
a set of PowerShell commands to disable Microsoft
Defender: deletes its service; terminates its process;
abuses the Defender restriction policies; disables
notifications and real-time protection (Maude,
2021). After that, TrickBot creates a scheduled task
at the system startup to ensure persistence (MSISAC, 2020).

Section 5 focuses on the main conclusions.
2. BACKGROUND ANALYSIS OF ATTACKS
ON MICROSOFT DEFENDER
This section covers the analysis of various attacks
on Microsoft Defender using opportunities of code
running in user- and kernel- modes.
Microsoft Defender is a security software deeply
integrated into the system with a lot of various
parts. However, it is possible to separate user-mode
modules, such as MsMpEng.exe, NisSrv.exe,
MsMpEngCP.exe, and MpEngine.dll, and kernelmode components, such as WdBoot.sys,
WdDevFlt.sys, WdFilter.sys, WdNisDrv.sys. Some
of them are deeply analyzed, such as MpEngine.dll
by Bulazel (2018), WdFilter by Narib (2020).

Beaume (2021) shares the PowerShell script that
disables Microsoft Defender, including scanning
engines via Set-MpPreference commands.
According to Cocomazzi and Pirozzi (2021),
Zloader Trojan disables Microsoft Defender and its
security modules such as Potentially Unwanted
Applications (PUA) protection and Real-Time
Monitoring, and adds exclusions, to hide all the
malware components from Microsoft Defender:

Security researchers analyzed various components
of Microsoft Defender or Microsoft Protection
Service. Bulazel (2018) at the BlackHat USA
presented the details of Microsoft Malware
Protection Engine (mpengine.dll), which is one of
the key user-mode components of Microsoft
Defender. Experts from CyberArk investigated a
file scanning process of Microsoft Defender
(Dekel, 2017). Grabber (2018) analyzed the

•

•

cmd /c powershell.exe -command “SetMpPreference -MAPSReporting 0” to
disable Microsoft Active Protection
Service.
powershell.exe
-command
“AddMpPreference -ExclusionProcess “*.exe””

Lakshmanan (2021) highlighted that MosaicLoader
malware uses similar PowerShell commands to
6
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exclude its installed folders from Defender
inspections. The reverse analysis of MosaicLoader
was done by Szeles (2021) from Bitdefender. The
logic of excluding the EXE file from being scanned
was analyzed by Gemzicki (2021).

Policy Object to disable Microsoft Defender, which
sets the flag DisableAntiSpyware. This flag is
designed to disable Microsoft Defender Antivirus
during the deployment of another antivirus product.
However, due to the Tamper Protection feature, this
flag is unavailable in the newest Windows OSes.

Abrams (2021) analyzed DeroHE ransomware and
concluded that it also hides itself from Microsoft
Defender by adding its folder to the exclusion by
using Windows Management Instrumentation
Command-line (WMIC) tool, named WMIC.EXE:
•

Sordum (2021) team issued a tool named Defender
Control that disables Microsoft Defender
permanently by setting the registry values,
modifying the group policies, and stopping
windefend service. The authors explained that their
work is designed to free precious resources if
another anti-malware protection system is installed.

@WMIC /Namespace:\\root\Microsoft\Win
dows\Defender class MSFT_MpPreference
call Add ExclusionPath=\"\Temp\\".

The rest of the section is focused on recent research
papers and blogs dealing with attacks on Microsoft
Defender. All attacks can be divided into two
groups: attacks in the kernel- and user- modes.

Bichet (2020), a security researcher from Intrinsec
analyzed Egregor and Prolock ransomware.
Egregor evades protection by creating a Group

Attack Vectors on Windows Defender

via DKOM

via syscalls

User-mode attacks

Reconfigure and stop
Windows Defender

Code Injection into the
Whitelisted Apps
Process Herpaderping evades
Windows Defender

Proposed in
the current
research
Prevented by
trust labels

Abuse Integrity Level
and Remove Privileges

Obfuscation, Encryption,
Sandbox Evasion

Kernel-mode attacks

Disabling ETW logger sessions
for Windows Defender

Disabling PPL to stop Windows
Defender
Disable Kernel Callbacks
Close handles to terminate
Windows Defender

Abuse NT symbolic links

Bypass Kernel Callbacks

Figure 2 Attack Vectors on Microsoft Defender
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2.1. KERNEL-MODE ATTACKS ON
MICROSOFT DEFENDER
All kernel-mode attacks can be divided into the
following subgroups:
•
•
•
•

drivers, the author calls ChangeServiceConfig2W()
to remove PsProtectSignerAntimalware-Light from
the WinDefend service and after that unloads the
WdFilter service.
One more driverless attack results in stopping
Defender Service (Dosxuz, 2022). The author uses
the Token Impersonation technique to escalate the
privileges.

Attacks on ETW.
Clear PPL to terminate the process.
Disable and Bypass Kernel Callbacks.
Terminate the Microsoft Defender Process
by closing its handles.

Terminate the Microsoft Defender Process by
closing its handles from the driver. Yasser (2019)
presented a tool named Backstab that can kill
protected processes. The author leverages the
Sysinternals Process Explorer (ProcExp) driver,
which is signed by Microsoft and supports closing
process handles, which leads to process
termination. PPL mechanism guarantees that the
protected processes cannot be terminated, even by
apps running with admin privileges. However,
using a driver such processes can be terminated,
without triggering any security reaction. Backstab
can terminate a Microsoft Defender that is running
as a Protected Process with Protection level, which
is equal to “PsProtectedSignerAntimalware-Light”.
One more feature is that attackers can duplicate the
handle for the malware process.

Attacks on ETW. Microsoft Defender uses various
Windows OS features: user-mode, kernel-mode
components, and it leverages Event Tracing for
Windows (ETW) facilities. ETW is a feature deeply
integrated into the OS kernel. ETW was originally
designed for performance troubleshooting, and it is
currently used by various EDR solutions as a
supplier of various OS-related events. ETW is
widely used by common EDR/AV solutions.
Microsoft Defender also uses ETW and gathers
data from two ETW sessions, named
DefenderApiLogger and DefenderAuditLogger.
These two sessions are protected by Secure ETW
(PPL mechanism) and cannot be stopped easily.
Teodorescu, Korkin, and Golchikov (2021) from
Binarly present a kernel-mode attack that results in
disabling ETW sessions without triggering any
reaction from PatchGuard. The problem is that
ETW can be easily tampered with. Such attacks
blind the whole class of EDR solutions, including
Microsoft Defender.

Disable Kernel Callbacks. Microsoft Defender
registered several kernel callbacks to be notified
about various OS events. Examples of bypassing
and removing kernel callbacks were given by
Feichter (2020), Stein (2020), Forrer and Bauters
(2021).

Clear PPL to Terminate the Process. Microsoft
Defender leverages the Protected Process Light
(PPL) mechanism to protect its process from being
terminated, as well as from code injections.

Karantzas and Patsakis (2021) specify the
following techniques to disable kernel callbacks:
•
•
•

However, attackers can use a kernel-mode driver to
clear the Process Protection level and after that,
they can terminate the Microsoft Defender easily
(Blaauwendraad et al., 2020). The authors admitted
that “killing the process will notify the user of the
machine that its antivirus program has been
disabled and prompt the user to restart the service.”

Zeroing the address of the callback routine;
Unregister the callback routine
Patch the code of callback routine.

Bs (2020) presented a tool named CheekyBlinder,
that leverages a signed vulnerable kernel-mode
driver to find process callback functions and
remove specific callbacks to blind EDR solutions.
The author tested his tool using Avast Free AV, but
the same techniques can be used to blind Microsoft
Defender.

Thompson (2017) demonstrated how to terminate
MsSence.exe, which is Microsoft Defender
Advanced Threat Protection Service, by removing
process protection via Mimikatz driver.

A similar attack on kernel callback routines was
explained using the Mimikatz driver by
Blaauwendraad et al., (2020) and Hand (2020). In
addition, the authors proposed to overwrite the

A similar attack that results in shutting down
Microsoft Defender Antivirus was presented by
Naceri (2021). However, apart from using kernel
8
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•

corresponding callback routine using RET
instruction. However, KPP can trigger such code
manipulations.

temporarily disabling the memory page
access permissions (Billinis, 2020);
• sandbox evasion, payload encryption, and
code injection (Born, 2021);
Killing Defender by abusing NT symbolic links.
Security expert Lagrasta (2021), a member of
Advanced Persistent Tortellini, revealed an
interesting way to bypass Microsoft Defender. His
idea is to apply NT symbolic links to temporarily
redirect “\Device\BootDevice” to another disk,
unload Windows Defender driver (WdFilter.sys),
and, finally, load a fake driver from the substitute
folder. The key point of this attack is that the
researcher
leverages
Windows
built-in
mechanisms, pushing Microsoft Defender to follow
the wrong path.

Bypass Kernel Callbacks. Using one of the usermode code injection techniques, which is based on
creating and mapping PE sections, attackers can
spoof the image name received by a callback
routine. As a result, the EDR receives a string with
a fake legitimate EXE name, while the loaded
malicious image will be hidden (Dylan, 2021).
2.2. USER-MODE ATTACKS ON
MICROSOFT DEFENDER
Reconfiguring Microsoft Defender. Researchers
continue the analysis of Microsoft Defender
configuration, which can be used to disable it. Lyk
(2020) has revealed that adding registry key and
setting value results is stopping Defender from
attaching to any volumes. WdFilter.sys can be
unloaded by Process Hacker by using the list of
loaded modules of the System:4 process.

Abuse Integrity Level and Remove Privileges.
One more attack based on Windows built-in
mechanisms was presented by Landau (2022). An
idea is to abuse Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)
and Security Reference Monitor (SRM) so that the
Microsoft Defender become sandboxed from all the
rest of the OS. The key security issue is that
Windows provides the following syscalls to modify
the protection features even for processes protected
by PPL:

Code Injection into the Whitelisted Apps.
Microsoft Defender includes a built-in whitelist of
some common process images, such as explorer.exe
and smartscreen.exe. It is possible to implant a
malware DLL into a whitelisted process and to
perform malware actions using a basic code
injection technique (T0mux, 2018).

•

SetTokenInformation() to minimize the
Token Integrity Level.
• AdjustTokenPrivileges() to disable all the
Token Privileges.
The author implemented a user-mode app named
NerfToken.exe to reduce the Token Integrity level
from system to untrusted and remove all privileges
for Microsoft Defender. The corresponding proofof-concept in C# was developed by TNP (2022)
and in C developed by pwn1sher (2022).

Microsoft Defender Evasion by Process
Herpaderping. Process Herpaderping is a
technique released by Shaw (2021) to evade
security products including Microsoft Defender.
The author revealed that a callback registered via
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine(Ex) “is invoked
when the initial thread is inserted, not when the
process object is created”. Using this feature,
attackers can confuse EDR/AV solutions by
modifying on-disk file process content after the
image has been mapped. The author successfully
tested the proposed technique on a system with
enabled Microsoft Defender on Windows 10.

Landau (2022) proposed a defense solution to block
this attack by using another Windows built-in
feature called “trust labels”. The author explained
that “trust labels allow Windows to restrict specific
access rights to certain types of protected
processes”. The corresponding open-source proofof-concept called PPLGuard designed by Elastic
(2022) protects all running anti-malware PPL
processes against this attack. PPLGuard is based on
a userland exploit from PPLdump designed by
Labro (2021) that abuse \KnownDlls. PPLGuard
prevents disabling the Integrity Level by
NerfToken-attack.

Obfuscation, Encryption, Sandbox Evasion.
Researchers reveal several ways to bypass
Defender scanning using the following techniques:
•
•
•

obfuscation (Defsecone 2020, Spinney
2019);
payload encryption (Secarma, 2021)
packing the payload (Unknow101, 2022);

9
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However, an attacker can use a kernel driver to
implement a similar attack, that cannot be blocked
by a user-mode defense solution, for example,
PPLGuard. One more feature that can be improved
is the number of removed privileges: Landau
(2022) proposed to remove all privileges from
Microsoft Defender, which is very suspicious and
can be easily detected. An idea is to remove only
important privileges, that help to disable Defender,
without removing all privileges.

3.1. RESEARCHING MICROSOFT
DEFENDER INTERNALS
To research the internals of Microsoft Defender, a
test bench was organized using the following steps:
•

•

The next section covers the research results
regarding the kernel attack based on Integrity Level
and Remove Privileges, including the research
results about Microsoft Defender Internals.

•

3. PROPOSED ATTACK ON MICROSOFT
DEFENDER

•

This section describes the analysis of how
Microsoft Defender detects malware before the
attack on Microsoft Defender’s kernel structures
and after it.

•

a)

VMWare with installed Windows 11 x64
and WinDbg connected via COM port was
used as a sandbox environment to research
Microsoft Defender’s internals during the
malware detection.
To trigger the reaction of Microsoft
Defender and keep the detection under
control, a zip password-protected archive
with a malware file was used (Figure 3, a).
The batch file was used to extract and
launch the malware file (Figure 3, c).
The Mimikatz app was used to trigger the
malware detection engine of Microsoft
Defender.
To monitor the reaction of Microsoft
Defender, the Process Monitor was used
(Figure 3, b).

b)

rmdir C:\adfsl2022\mimikatz /S/Q
7z.exe x C:\adfsl2022\mimikatz.zip -oC:\adfsl2022\mimikatz -pinfected
dir "C:\adfsl2022\mimikatz\mimikatz_trunk\x64"
"C:\adfsl2022\mimikatz\mimikatz_trunk\x64\mimikatz.exe"
c)
Figure 3 – The testbench components: a) password-protected archive with malware (Mimikatz app)
b) Process Monitor with enabled Filter to monitor events only for the specified path
c) batch commands for extracting and launching the malware file from the specified path

10
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3.2. DEFAULT BEHAVIOR OF MICROSOFT
DEFENDER
First, the default behavior of Microsoft Defender
was inspected using the aforementioned steps.
The fragments of ProcMon output show the key
stages of experiments:
•
•
•

Figure 4 shows that 7Z.EXE is extracting
and writing the malware image file to the
disk.
Figure 5 shows that MsMpEng.EXE a core
process of Microsoft Defender is reading
the newly extracted malware file.
Figure 6 ProcMon log shows that
MsMpEng.exe is removing the detected
malware file and after that, Microsoft
Defender checks the file has been removed.
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To remove malware file from the disk
MsMpEng.EXE
calls
NtSetInformationFile()
WinApi
function,
with
input
parameter
FILE_DISPOSITION_INFORMATION_EX.Flags
which is FILE_DISPOSITION_DELETE.
This flag indicates that the file is marked as deleted,
and it will be deleted after the link count for the file
became zero or all open handles for this file will be
closed.
Microsoft Defender checks the file has been
removed by calling CreateFile(). Figure 6 shows
that CreateFile() function returns the status
“DELETE_PENDING” and finally “NAME NOT
FOUND”, which indicates that the file is removed.
The next part covers the behavior of Microsoft
Defender after the manipulation of its kernel
structure.
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Figure 4 – Step-1: ProcMon output shows that 7Z.EXE is extracting and writing the malware to the disk

Figure 5 – Step-2: ProcMon output shows that Microsoft Defender is reading the newly extracted file

Figure 6 – Step-3: ProcMon output shows that Microsoft Defender is removing the detected file and
checking that the file has been removed

12
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3.3. MANDATORY INTEGRITY CONTROL
(MIC)
This section covers the internals of Mandatory
Integrity Control (MIC) and how it can be used to
restrict Microsoft Defender.
3.3.1. Security Reference Monitor (SRM):
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
One of the main Windows security mechanisms is
Security Reference Monitor (SRM), which
implements Discretionary Access Control using
access tokens and object security descriptors.
The information about process privileges is stored
in the access token, which has a list of Security
Identifier (SID). The security information about
each object, for example, a file, a directory, or a
registry key, is stored in the object security
descriptor. An object security descriptor defines
who can do what with this object.
When a program is accessing an object, SRM uses
process token and object security descriptor to
determine whether an access request should be
granted. The security descriptor includes a
Discretionary Access Control List (DACL), which
comprises zero or more Access Control Entries
(ACE). Each ACE includes SIDs and access rights
for each SID.
Each time a process tries to get access to the object,
for example, open a file or directory, an access
request is generated. SRM processes an access
request to grant or deny this access by comparing
the SIDs from the access token and SIDs from the
security descriptor located in DACL. This access
control decision is implemented in the kernel-mode
function nt!SeAccessCheck, which is one of the
key functions of the Windows security model
(Sandker, 2018). An example of an attack on token
structures to bypass nt!SeAccessCheck was
published in the JDFSL (Korkin, 2021).
Microsoft Defender as a system application
executes with high privileges of the SYSTEM
account with SID equals S-1-5-18 (NT
Authority\System).
However, starting from Windows Vista, the SRM
mechanism has been extended by adding a new
feature named Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC).
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Microsoft Defender can be disabled by tampering
with MIC. The next section covers the MIC details.
3.3.2. Security Reference Monitor (SRM):
Mandatory Integrity Control (MIC)
MIC Overview. Mandatory Integrity Control
(MIC) expands DACL and is designed to isolate
untrusted processes from the rest of the OS (Riley,
2006). MIC is defined by new integrity levels (ILs)
that represent additional levels of trustworthiness
and a mandatory policy to control access to objects.
ILs are represented by Security Identifiers (SIDs).
Each object in Windows, such as a process, a
registry key, or a file, has a separate IL, see
Figure 7
Windows 11 supports the following ILs with the
increasing privileges:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Untrusted (0);
Low (1);
Medium (2);
High (3);
System (4);
Protected (5).

Microsoft Defender is running with System IL.
Core system apps, such as Services and Controller
app, are running with High and System ILs, while
Medium and High ILs are used by user’s
applications, such as Word, Skype, or Google
Drive. To reduce the severity of web-based threats,
web browsers (e.g. chrome) are running at low IL.
Each time any subject (e.g. process) attempts to
interact with a target object (e.g. another process or
a file), MIC checks the ILs of the initiator and the
target.
MIC mandatory policy implements a Bell-LaPadula
Model (BLP) and guarantees that the applications
with low IL cannot get write or delete access to the
objects with higher IL, even if the DACL-based
SRM allows these access attempts. MIC restricts
only reading process memory, it does not restrict
read access to the files (Laiho, 2016).
A process can write to or delete an object only
when its IL is equal or higher than the object’s IL.
The next section covers the details of how MIC is
implemented in Windows and how it can be used to
disable Microsoft Defender.
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Figure 7 – Newly created folders by default have an integrity level equals medium
MIC Internals. The research has revealed that
Microsoft Defender periodically walks through the
directories and opens processes and symbolic links.
The corresponded WinAPI functions invoke
nt!SeAccessCheck(), see Figure 8.
The pseudocode snippets of nt!SeAccessCheck()
and nt!SepMandatoryIntegrityCheck() functions are
presented in Figure 9 a) and b).
For each running process, the information about its
Integrity Level is stored in the field named

IntegrityLevelIndex, which is located in the
“EPROCESS.Token” structure.
Each time the process tries to access any object, the
OS
checks
the
privileges
by
calling
nt!SeAccessCheck()
and
then
nt!SepMandatoryIntegrityCheck(), that reads the
IntegrityLevelIndex field.
The next paragraph shows an attack on Defender’s
Integrity Levels.

MsMpEng.exe
mpengine!MpBootStrap

WTSAPI32!WTSQueryUserToken
KERNELBASE
OpenProcessToken

QueryDosDeviceW

NtOpenProcessToken

NtOpenDirectoryObject

NtOpenProcessToken

NtOpenDirectoryObject

ntdll
NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject

nt
NtOpenSymbolicLinkObject

ObpCreateHandle

SeAccessCheck

SepMandatoryIntegrityCheck

Figure 8 Defender calls functions that invoke SeAccessCheck() and SepMandatoryIntegrityCheck() during
accessing file system
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a)

b)

Figure 9 The pseudocode snippets for the functions:
a) nt!SeAccessCheck() and b) nt!SepMandatoryIntegrityCheck()
Patching IntergrityLevelIndex. To restrict
Microsoft Defender, we tried to overwrite the
IntergrityLevelIndex
field
using
(-1)
or
0xFFFFFFFF value. This manipulation sets the
lowest privilege (SeUntrustedMandatorySid) to the
Defender process. Figure 10 a) and b) shows the
Integrity Level of Microsoft Defender before and
after patching.
After that we run the batch script to extract and run
malware, see Figure 3, a) once more. Figure 11
shows the corresponding ProcMon output.
As a result, Microsoft Defender cannot overwrite or
delete malware files. However, we still fail to
launch an extracted malware file, the CreateFile
API
returns
status
0xC0000906
(STATUS_VIRUS_INFECTED).
This
status
means that “The operation did not complete
successfully because the file contains a virus”.
The research has revealed that this status is returned
by WdFilter.sys, a Windows Defender driver.
WdFilter driver registers a mini-filter to monitor
file operations via FltRegisterFilter. WdFilter

a)

prevents launching a malware file using Post-create
callback by calling FltCancelFileOpen with status
0xC0000906 (STATUS_VIRUS_INFECTED) or
0xC0000022 (STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED).
Examples of mini-filters that protect files are
implemented in HazardShield (xqrzd, 2015) and
into the AvScan (Microsoft Corporation, 2015).
After Patching IntergrityLevelIndex Microsoft
Defender did not show a Windows pop-up
notification about the detected threat, however, the
malware process still cannot be launched.
The reason for that is that Microsoft Defender still
can get open access to the launched process to
inspect its memory and blocked the process. The
core anti-malware logic of Microsoft Defender is
implemented in the user-mode library named
mpengine.dll, running inside the MsMpEng
process.
The next paragraph shows how to restrict Microsoft
Defender from inspecting memory of another
process.

b)

Figure 10 Integrity Level of Procmon: a) before patching IntergrityLevelIndex field and b) after it
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Figure 11 ProcMon output shows that cmd fails to open mimikatz file with error status 0xC0000906
3.4. TOKEN: REVOKE THE DEBUG
PRIVILEGE
The research has revealed that Microsoft Defender
inspects the newly launched process, the
corresponding WinAPI functions are shown in
Figure 12.
To restrict Microsoft Defender from inspecting a
memory of newly created processes, attackers can
revoke its Token Privileges. In the attack proposed
by Landau (2022) all Microsoft Defender privileges
were revoked. Our research task was to research
and decrease the number of revoked privileges.
Information about process privileges is located in
the
kernel
memory
in
the
structure
_SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES, which is located in
the Token from the EPROCESS structure. This
structure includes three fields: Present, Enabled,
and EnabledByDefault.
According to the MSDN (2021a), Chen (2008) “by
default, users can debug only processes that they
own. In order to debug processes owned by other
users, you have to possess the SeDebugPrivilege
privilege”.
The research has revealed that clearing the
SeDebugPrivilege bit from the field “Enabled”,
which
is
located
in
the
“EPROCESS.Token.Privileges”, is enough to
prevent Microsoft Defender from inspecting the
memory of newly launched malware processes and
blocking them.
The next paragraph summarizes the attack steps
and presents the tested results.
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3.5. ATTACK’S SUMMARY AND TESTING
This research has revealed that Microsoft Defender
detects and prevents malware propagation by using
several stages:
I.

II.

At first, Microsoft Defender inspects the
newly created files on the disk by opening
the directory and files.
Second, Microsoft Defender inspects the
newly launched process by inspecting their
memory.

The proposed attack includes patching the
following fields of the “EPROCESS.Token”
structure corresponding to the Microsoft Defender:
I.
II.

IntergrityLevelIndex has to be overwritten
by 0xFFFFFFFF or (-1).
Clear the SeDebugPrivilege bit from
“Privileges. Enable”.

The summary scheme of the attack is presented in
Figure 13.
The experimental results show that these
manipulations lead to extracting and launching
malware using the script from Figure 3. The
ProcMon output log shows that mimikatz has been
successfully launched, see Figure 14.
Experiments show that attackers can execute even
known malware by disabling Microsoft Defender
without triggering any reaction from Windows
security features, such as Kernel Patch Protector
(KPP or PatchGuard).
The next section covers how to prevent this attack
and protect Microsoft Defender.
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MsMpEng
Mpengine.dll

mpsvc!ServiceCrtMain

KERNELBASE
OpenProcess

ProcessIdToSessionId

OpenThreadToken

OpenThread

NtOpenProcess

NtOpenThreadToken

NtOpenThread

NtOpenProcess

NtOpenThreadTokenEx

NtOpenThread

PsOpenProcess

ObInsertObjectEx

PsOpenThread

ntdll

nt

SeSinglePrivilegeCheckEx

SepCreateAccessStateFromSubjectContext

SePrivilegeCheck

SepPrivilegeCheck

Figure 12 – Defender calls functions that invoke SepPrivilegeCheck() and
SepCreateAccessStateFromSubjectContext() during accessing launched processes
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i) Open files
on the disk
(failed)

2) Unpacks &
install a malware

Attackers App

Some Known
malware

ii) Open
launched
processes
(failed)

Microsoft
Defender
Application
User mode
Kernel mode

1) Use a kernel driver to
disable Microsoft Defender by
patching its kernel structures

_EPROCESS structure for
Microsoft Defender Application
Token _TOKEN

i) Overwrite by 0xFFFFFFFF

• IntegrityLevelIndex
Privileges _SEP_TOKEN_PRIVILEGES

Attackers Driver

ii) Delete SeDebugPrivilege

• Present
• Enabled
• EnabledByDefault

Figure 13 – Malware app leverages a kernel driver to disable Microsoft Defender

Figure 14 ProcMon output shows that the mimikatz app has been successfully launched without terminating
the Microsoft Defender process (MsMpEng.exe)
4. CUSTOMIZATION OF MEMORYRANGER
TO PREVENT NEW ATTACKS
The presented attack on Microsoft Defender can be
prevented by restricting illegal access to the kernel
memory, which can be achieved by leveraging
bare-metal hypervisors. Several open-source
hypervisors can be used, such as Kernel-Bridge by
HoShiMin (2021) or MemoryRanger by Korkin
(2021). We decided to use MemoryRanger because
it is designed to prevent attacks on kernel data. This
18

section describes the details of how MemoryRanger
can be customized to prevent disabling on
Microsoft Defender.
MemoryRanger Intro. MemoryRanger (MR) is a
software security solution designed to protect
Windows OS kernel data from illegal access by
kernel drives.
MR includes two main parts: a kernel-mode driver
and a bare-metal hypervisor (type 1 hypervisor).
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MR driver registers a few OS-level callback
routines to be notified about various OS events:
loading (unloading) drivers, creation (termination)
processes. This driver sends information about
really revealed sensitive data to the hypervisor.
A key part of MR is the bare-metal hypervisor that
leverages Intel hardware-assisted virtualization
technology (VT-x) and Extended Page Tables
(EPT). One of the security features of the MR
hypervisor is its ability to execute kernel drivers
into isolated memory enclaves. Each enclave has a
separate memory access configuration that restricts
access to the kernel memory from drivers running
inside the enclave.
MR has been chosen as a basic platform to protect
kernel structures of Microsoft Defender.

•
•
•
•
•

5. CONCLUSIONS
To sum up, the following should be highlighted:
•

MemoryRanger Customization. The following
updates were added to the MemoryRanger to
restrict access to its Token structure:
•
•

•
•

MR driver locates EPROCESS structures
for Microsoft Defender.
MR driver reveals the addresses and sizes of
the sensitive memory areas:
o “Token.IntegrityLevelIndex” (4 bytes)
o “Token.Privileges.Enabled” (8 bytes)
MR driver traps loading of new drivers by
installing a callback routine.
MR hypervisor is notified about newly
loaded drivers and creates a separate
enclave for each of them. MR hypervisor
restricts access to the sensitive memory
areas for each loaded driver.

This scheme helps to trap loading of attacker’s
driver and prevents illegal access to the Microsoft
Defender, see Figure 15. The scheme does not
restrict access from OS core, such as ntoskrnl.exe,
and all kernel drivers loaded before MR.

MemoryRanger Testing and its Benchmark
Assessment. Experimental results show that this
approach helps to prevent the attack with affordable
performance degradation. The testbed has the
following configuration:
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The computing testbed includes the host
OS and VMware Workstation, which runs
VM OS.
PC with Intel i9-11900 CPU and 64 GB
RAM is a host hardware platform.
VM OS has been launched inside VMware
using a CPU with 4 logical cores and 16
GB RAM.
Windows 10, version 20H2 Build
10.0.19044 x64 is used for Host.
Windows 11, version 20H2 Build
10.0.22000 x64 is used for VM.

•

•

•

•

Kernel-mode threats are still very
dangerous for Windows OS. Attackers can
exploit vulnerable drivers, sign malware
drivers using leaked digital certificates. The
existing Windows security features are not
enough to restrict all these attack vectors.
Global kernel malware trend is to bypass or
blind security products without terminating
the AV/EDR processes. As a result,
Windows AV, Microsoft Defender is
facing a huge rise in such attacks.
Microsoft Defender can be attacked by
several vectors. One of the recently
published attacks abuses its Integrity level
and removes all process privileges via
WinAPI functions. However, this attack
can be stopped by using trust labels.
Nevertheless, by patching kernel data
structures of Microsoft Defender attackers
can disable it, without terminating any of
its processes and without triggering any
security features, e.g. PatchGuard.
The customized MemoryRanger prevents
this attack. Both an attack and its
prevention has been tested on recent
Windows 11.

Preventing kernel-mode threats. Basics. In
modern operating systems such as Windows
OS and Unix-based OS kernel-mode drivers
share the same memory with the OS kernel
core. This helps to improve the overall
performance, but it also raise a security
challenge with untrusted kernel components
that can be used by attackers.
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The general solution of preventing kernel
attacks in modern OS is to isolate trusted kernel
components from untrusted ones. Microsoft
experts developed a Hyper-V that allow to run
two separate kernel enclaves, named VTL0 (or
Normal Mode) and VTL1 (or Secure Mode).

kernel driver and support flexible memory
access restriction.
At the same time, there are several research
solutions that leverage hypervisor-based
technology to create isolated enclaves to isolate
drivers:

The Windows OS kernel core and all drivers
are running into the VTL0. OS built-in kernel
sensitive components such as Secure Kernel
Code Integrity (skci.dll) and Kernel Mode
Cryptographic Primitives Library (cng.sys) are
loaded into VTL1.

•

This Microsoft scheme protects the memory of
sensitive built-in components from illegal
access by malware drivers. However, it does
not provide isolation of third-party drivers and
it support just two kernel enclaves

•

•

However, placing each driver into a separate
isolated enclaves will cause a serious
performance degradation.

The designed MemoryRanger dynamically
allocates a separate kernel enclave for each

ii) Unpack
& install a
malware

Defender fails
to remove the
malware

Known malware

i) Disable Defender
by patching kernel
data
Attacker s
Console App

Microsoft
Defender

The security research on blocking kernel-mode
threats in modern OSes is still in progress.

The malware has
been removed

Token structure

Attacker s
Driver
Drivers
Loaded
Earlier

Unpack & install
a malware
Known malware

The Default Enclave
Microsoft
Defender

Attacker s
Console App

EPROCESS for
Defender
NT OS
kernel

The Enclave for Attacker s Driver
Attacker s
Console App

EPROCESS for
Defender
NT OS
kernel

Token structure

Attacker s
Driver
Non-sensitive
data

one enclave used in HACS by Wang
et.al. (2017), and AllMemPro by
Korkin (2018-a);
two enclaves used in LKMG by Tian
et.al. (2018), and EPTI by Hua et.el.
(2018);
three enclaves used in LAKEED by
Tian et.al. (2017);

Microsoft
Defender
EPROCESS for
Defender

NT OS
kernel

Token structure

Attacker s
Driver

Drivers
Loaded
Earlier

Non-sensitive
data

Drivers
Loaded
Earlier

Non-sensitive
data

Situation without MemoryRanger
MemoryRanger switches
between enclaves and
protects memory data

MemoryRanger

Figure 15 – MemoryRanger protects the Token structure fields of the Microsoft Defender application from
being patched by an attacker’s driver using two enclaves: the default one for drivers loaded earlier and a
separate enclave for newly loaded attacker’s driver
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6. APPENDIX A – TESTING ATTACK ON AV
The proposed attack was tested using some popular
AV solutions, see Error! Reference source not

found.. We can see that the proposed attack has
blinded vast majority of AVs.

Table 1. Summary table of attacked AV solutions.
AV Name
Microsoft Defender
McAfee
Malwarebytes
Avast
AVG
Kaspersky
Trend Micro

AV ability to detect malicious files
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Active, but
AV cannot remove malware files

7. APPENDIX B – USING METASPLOIT TO
TRIGGER MICROSOFT DEFENDER
A payload sample generated by the Metasploit
Project can also be used to trigger Microsoft
Defender and proof that it has been disabled.
The Metasploit Project is a computer security
project that provides information about security
vulnerabilities, IDS signature development, and
aids in developing and using exploit code. This
project includes several sub-projects: the Opcode
Database, tools for evasion and anti-forensic,
shellcode archive, and other research tools.
Metasploit was created by H. D. Moore in 2003 as
a portable network tool using Perl. The project was
released in 2004, it is completely free. By 2007, the
Metasploit Framework had been completely
rewritten in Ruby. In 2009 the project was acquired
by Massachusetts-based security company Rapid7.
Metasploit is an open-source tool for developing
and executing exploit code against a remote target
machine. According to Kennedy et al. (2011), “this
open-source platform provides a consistent, reliable
library of constantly updated exploits and offers a
complete development environment for building
new tools and automating every aspect of a
penetration test” (p. 16). The project includes about
600 payloads, which can run scripts or arbitrary
commands against the host, grab the screen, upload
and download files, evade antivirus defense, enable
static IP address/port forwarding. The framework
can be installed on macOS, Windows, and Linux.
21

AV ability to detect malicious processes
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Disabled
Enabled
Disabled

Msfvenom is a command-line tool from the
Metasploit package. The tool is used for generating
various types of payloads. It provides the set of
variable payloads from Metasploit, types of
payload encodings, and various output file types.
According to Clarke (2020), “One example of using
msfvenom in Kali Linux is to use it to create a
malicious program that will connect the victim’s
system to your pentest system (a reverse shell),
enabling you to obtain a meterpreter session with
the target” (p. 139). Meterpreter session is a session
with additional environment features, such as
unified commands for all types of OS, the ability to
upload and download files, including modules for
post-exploitation.
For testing, we created a payload sample for
Windows
using
the
type
“payload/windows/messagebox” without additional
encodings. The sample shows a message box that
contains the following text: “Hello, from MSF!”.
Here is the command for generating the payload for
x86 Windows:
“msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p
windows/messagebox TEXT=“Hello, from
MSF!” -f exe > mes.exe”
According to Ortiz (2020), "Msfvenom creates
payloads with common signatures that are picked
up by almost all anti-virus solutions". As a result,
without applying obfuscation techniques, the
“malware codes are detected by several commercial
antivirus packages. However, after applying
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different obfuscation methods, detection is much
harder” (Palacios and Pérez-Sánchez, 2022).
Microsoft Defender reveals the payload samples
created without custom encryption and defines
them as viruses. This example will be used to check
whether or not Microsoft Defender is enabled.
Without tampering with Microsoft Defender, the
generated payload sample is detected by virus and
threat protection, see Figure 16.

The loaded 32-bit driver modifies the integrity level
and downgrades the privileges of Microsoft
Defender. The payload sample has not been
blocked by Microsoft Defender, see Figure 17.
Microsoft Defender from Windows 10 32 bit has
the same vulnerability and can be disabled by
patching its EPROCESS.

Figure 16 – The payload has been detected and blocked by Microsoft Defender
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Figure 17 – The payload has not been detected by Microsoft Defender.
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